The free pdf book linked below is the proceedings of the joint workshop between the Pontifical Academy of Sciences and Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences that happened in Vatican City last year. The workshop's theme was “Sustainable Humanity, Sustainable Nature: Our Responsibility.”
Throughout 704 pages, you can find quality papers written by prominent authors that are organized by a well-balanced editing. I think this latest publication from the Vatican Press could save you some money from buying some mediocre textbooks on sustainable development.
Bibliographic information:
Dasgupta, P. S., Ramanathan, V., & Sorondo, M. S. (Eds.). (2015). Sustainable Humanity, Sustainable Nature: Our Responsibility. Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. [Full-text at http://j.mp/Sustainability_Vatican_Press]
Selected Table of Contents:
Introduction........................................... 14
Sustainable Humanity, Sustainable Nature: Our
Responsibility
Oscar Andrés Cardinal Rodríguez Maradiaga, SDB......... 22
Programme.............................................. 37
List of Participants................................... 42
I. THE BROADER CONTEXT
Human-Nature Co-Evolution
Werner Arber........................................... 49
The Emergence of Humans: Brains (Bodies and Hands), Mind
and Soul
Yves Coppens........................................... 55
THE NEW ERA OF HUMAN-NATURE INTERACTIONS
II. FUNDAMENTAL DRIVERS OF FOOD, HEALTH, AND ENERGY
NEEDS
Impediments to Sustainable Development: Externalities in
Human-Nature Exchanges
Partha Dasgupta........................................ 63
Population et Nature: Antagonisme ou Concordance? People
and Nature: Antagonism or Concordance?
Gérard-François Dumont................................. 79
Food Demand, Natural Resources, and Nature
Joachim von Braun..................................... 115
Sustainable Development Goals for a New Era
Jeffrey D. Sachs...................................... 134
III. ANTHROPOCENE: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate-System Tipping Points and Extreme Weather Events
Hans Joachim Schellnhuber and Maria A. Martin......... 151
An Oceanographic Perspective
Walter Munk........................................... 171
IV. COMPETING DEMANDS ON NATURE AS A SOURCE
Can We “Save” the Ocean?
Nancy Knowlton........................................ 181
Tropical Forests, for Richer and for Poorer
Jeffrey R. Vincent.................................... 192
The Promise of Mega-Cities: Moving from Despair to Hope.
Urban Informality and the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro
Janice Perlman........................................ 206
V. COMPETING DEMANDS ON THE CRYOSPHERE
Glaciers as Source of Water: The Himalaya
Anil V. Kulkarni...................................... 219
The Polar Regions
Peter Wadhams......................................... 225
VI. COMPETING DEMANDS ON THE BIOSPHERE
Green Fields: Feeding the Hungry, Raising the Poor and
Protecting Nature in Africa
Robert (Bob) Scholes.................................. 239
Stability of Coastal Zones
Marcia McNutt......................................... 248
VII. SOCIETY’S RESPONSE TO CURRENT UNSUSTAINABLE
GROWTH
Why Have Climate Negotiations Proved So Disappointing?
Scott Barrett......................................... 261
Towards an Inclusive “Green Economy”: Rethinking Ethics
and Economy in the Age of the Anthropocene
Achim Steiner......................................... 277
The Two Worlds Approach for Mitigating Air Pollution and
Climate Change
Veerabhadran Ramanathan............................... 285
Mainstreaming the Values of Nature for People into
Decision-Making
Gretchen C. Daily..................................... 301
Energy for Sustainable and Equitable Development
Daniel M. Kammen, Peter Alstone, Dimitry Gershenson... 316
Global Knowledge Action Network
Charles F. Kennel..................................... 347
Sustainable Transformation of Human Society in Asia
Yuan Tseh Lee......................................... 370
VIII. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society
Endangers our Future
Joseph E. Stiglitz.................................... 379
Humanity’s Responsibility Toward Creation – An Ethical and
Anthropological Challenge
Archbishop Roland Minnerath........................... 400
Nature and the Law: The Global Commons and the Common
Concern of Humankind
Edith Brown Weiss..................................... 407
IX. SOCIAL INCLUSION
Towards a Social Balance of the Current Globalization
Juan J. Llach......................................... 425
Sustainable Education: Uruguay’s Plan Ceibal
Antonio M. Battro and Cecilia de la Paz............... 448
Being Trafficked to Work: How Can Human Trafficking Be
Made Unsustainable?
Margaret S. Archer.................................... 460
Precariedad laboral, exclusión social y economía popular
Juan Grabois.......................................... 483
The Influence of Virtuous Human Life in Sustaining Nature
Stefano Zamagni....................................... 539
Social Inclusion in Governance and Peace-Building in Asia
Wilfrido V. Villacorta................................ 567
X. CLOSING SESSION: MOTIVATING SOCIETIES
What Role for Scientists?
Naomi Oreskes, Dale Jamieson, Michael Oppenheimer..... 617
Existential Risks
Martin Rees........................................... 650
Humanity’s Responsibility Toward Nature
Enrico Berti.......................................... 661
XI. CELEBRATIONS FOR THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
PASS
The History of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences
Herbert Schambeck..................................... 669
Summary
Werner Arber.......................................... 677
Statement of the Joint PAS/PASS Workshop on
“Sustainable Humanity, Sustainable Nature: Our
Responsibility”
...................................................... 685
Signatories to the Statement.......................... 704
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
Monday, May 18, 2015
The Adequacy of the 2-Degrees-Celsius Warming Target and the Global Progress to Date
During the past two years (June 2013–May 2015), 70-something climate experts have gathered at the UNFCCC and reviewed (a) the adequacy of the 2 °C (3.6 °F) warming target and (b) the global progress to realize the climate goal. This month, they published their conclusions. The following 10 messages are the gist of the conclusion report.
"There's still a chance, although time is running out fast."
(See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for visualized explanations of the sentence.)
I hope this cliché sentence will finally become the last of its kind this year. The world is looking up to COP 21 in Paris (November 30–December 11, 2015). Meanwhile, you can check out your country's progress at the Climate Action Tracker.
Message 1
A long-term global goal defined by a temperature limit serves its purpose well
Parties to the Convention agreed on an upper limit for global warming of 2 °C, and science has provided a wealth of information to support the use of that goal. Despite the irreversibility of global warming, cutting carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions now affects future warming within a few years. Removing CO2 from the atmosphere results in cooling. Adding other limits to the long-term global goal, such as sea level rise or ocean acidification, only reinforces the basic finding emerging from the analysis of the temperature limit, namely that we need to take urgent and strong action to reduce GHG emissions. However, the limitations of working only with a temperature limit could be taken into account, for example, by aiming to limit global warming to below 2 °C.
Message 2
Imperatives of achieving the long-term global goal are explicitly articulated and at our disposal, and demonstrate the cumulative nature of the challenge and the need to act soon and decisively
Scenario analysis shows that limiting global warming to below 2 °C implies the following: a large reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions in the short to medium term, global carbon dioxide neutrality early in the second half of this century, and negative global greenhouse gas emissions towards the end of the twenty-first century. The longer we wait to bend the currently increasing curve of global emissions downward, the steeper we will have to bend it, even with negative emissions. Limiting global warming to below 2 °C necessitates a radical transition (deep decarbonization now and going forward), not merely a fine tuning of current trends.
Message 3
Assessing the adequacy of the long-term global goal implies risk assessments and value judgments not only at the global level, but also at the regional and local levels
The global climate determines regionally experienced risks. While global assessments of climate risks inform global policy choices and global risk management, they should be complemented by regional and local perspectives. A key element of these perspectives is the value judgment of when the scale (e.g. frequency and severity) of climate impacts results in a transition from ‘acceptable’ to ‘unacceptable’. This leads to a greater appreciation of the role played by all decision makers, including subnational authorities and cities.
Message 4
Climate change impacts are hitting home
Significant climate impacts are already occurring at the current level of global warming and additional magnitudes of warming will only increase the risk of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts. Therefore, the ‘guardrail’ concept, which implies a warming limit that guarantees full protection from dangerous anthropogenic interference, no longer works. This calls for a consideration of societally or otherwise acceptable risks of climate impacts.
Message 5
The 2 °C limit should be seen as a defence line
Limiting global warming to below 2 °C would significantly reduce the projected high and very high risks of climate impacts corresponding to 4 °C of warming, which is where we are headed under a ‘business as usual’ scenario. It would also allow a significantly greater potential for adaptation to reduce risks. However, many systems and people with limited adaptive capacity, notably the poor or otherwise disadvantaged, will still be at very high risk, and some risks, such as those from extreme weather events, will also remain high. Adaptation could reduce some risks (e.g. risks to food production could be reduced to ‘medium’) but the risks to crop yields and water availability are unevenly distributed. Moreover, the risks of global aggregated impacts and large-scale singular events will become moderate. The ‘guardrail’ concept, in which up to 2 °C of warming is considered safe, is inadequate and would therefore be better seen as an upper limit, a defence line that needs to be stringently defended, while less warming would be preferable.
Message 6
Limiting global warming to below 2 °C is still feasible and will bring about many co-benefits, but poses substantial technological, economic and institutional challenges
The costs are manageable, even without taking into account the co-benefits of mitigation, and various policy options could be deployed to manage the risks of the necessary mitigation action.
The feasibility of the long-term global goal could be assessed in an emerging, iterative, global risk management framework that has multiple feedbacks from different sources and takes into account planetary boundaries. To this end, periodic reviews would provide an opportunity to assess and reassess the overall progress towards reducing risks of climate impacts and progress of mitigation and adaptation action, thereby contributing to a science-based risk management of the pathways to a low-carbon and climate-resilient future.
Message 7
We know how to measure progress on mitigation but challenges still exist in measuring progress on adaptation
A generally accepted metric exists for aggregating and measuring overall progress on mitigation, but no single metric exists to quantify and aggregate the overall progress on adaptation. Similarly, a widely accepted metric to measure overall progress on reducing risks of climate impacts by adaptation would be required in the context of a global risk management framework.
Message 8
The world is not on track to achieve the long-term global goal, but successful mitigation policies are known and must be scaled up urgently
Greenhouse gas emission growth has accelerated, reaching a record high during the decade 2000–2010. The Cancun pledges are only consistent with the long-term global goal with pathways that require a much higher mitigation response later. Moreover, policies in place have had a limited impact on bending the emissions curve downward. However, successful mitigation policies have been identified and progress is being made on scaling them up, in particular in relation to putting a price on carbon and promoting otherwise low-carbon technologies, so that their share becomes dominant. We need benchmarks for sound climate policy in the light of national circumstances.
National information was not made available in a balanced manner for consideration by the structured expert dialogue, but such information could be considered in future reviews.
Message 9
We learned from various processes, in particular those under the Convention, about efforts to scale up provision of finance, technology and capacity-building for climate action
Many of the technologies required to achieve the long-term global goal are already available, but their deployment is not on track. Various barriers to their deployment and transfer have been identified. There is no widely accepted definition of climate finance, and uncertainties remain in the tracking of climate finance flows, in particular for adaptation finance and private finance, and to a lesser extent also for mitigation finance. Discussions are ongoing in various processes under the Convention regarding the resources required to address climate change under emission scenarios that limit the temperature increase to below 2 °C.
Institutions and processes launched under the Convention on technology and capacity-building have built a foundation for much greater effort, and progress has been achieved in the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund. The level of action now needs to be increased on all fronts.
Message 10
While science on the 1.5 °C warming limit is less robust, efforts should be made to push the defence line as low as possible
The science on the 1.5 °C warming limit is less robust than for the 2 °C warming limit or warming beyond this limit. Consequently, assessing the differences between the future impacts of climate risks for 1.5 °C and 2 °C of warming remains challenging. More scientific findings are likely to become available in the future, and considerations on strengthening the long-term global goal to 1.5 °C may therefore have to continue.
Nevertheless, limiting global warming to below 1.5 °C would come with several advantages in terms of coming closer to a safer ‘guardrail’. It would avoid or reduce risks, for example, to food production or unique and threatened systems such as coral reefs or many parts of the cryosphere, including the risk of sea level rise. On the other hand, this implies a more pronounced reliance on negative emissions with associated risks, including those from land-use change, as well as increases in mitigation costs in comparison with the 2 °C warming limit, and requires a larger temperature overshoot, which also carries certain risks.
However, while it is unclear whether the difference between 2 °C and 1.5 °C of warming is really only a matter of a gradual increase in risks or also includes some non-linear effects, as some evidence from the palaeo-record indicates,a Parties may wish to take a precautionary route by aiming for limiting global warming as far below 2 °C as possible, reaffirming the notion of a defence line or even a buffer zone keeping warming well below 2 °C.
Figure 1. The relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, cumulative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and changes in annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050.
Source: IPCC (2014)
Figure 2. Timings of global net-zero emissions for carbon dioxide (CO2; top row) and greenhouse gas (GHG; bottom row) in two different scenarios ("If we collectively act from 2020" vs "If we had begun the effort since 2010").
Source: UNEP (2014)
References:
IPCC. (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. [Full-text at http://j.mp/IPCC_AR5_Synthesis]
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), & Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). (2015). Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013–2015 review. Note by the co-facilitators of the structured expert dialogue. (FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1). Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). [Full-text at http://j.mp/SED_UNFCCC]
UNEP. (2014). The Emissions Gap Report 2014. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). [Full-text at http://j.mp/EGR2014]
van Renssen, S. (2015). Getting a fair deal. Nature Climate Change, 5(6), 513–514. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2661]
"There's still a chance, although time is running out fast."
(See Figure 1 and Figure 2 for visualized explanations of the sentence.)
I hope this cliché sentence will finally become the last of its kind this year. The world is looking up to COP 21 in Paris (November 30–December 11, 2015). Meanwhile, you can check out your country's progress at the Climate Action Tracker.
Message 1
A long-term global goal defined by a temperature limit serves its purpose well
Parties to the Convention agreed on an upper limit for global warming of 2 °C, and science has provided a wealth of information to support the use of that goal. Despite the irreversibility of global warming, cutting carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions now affects future warming within a few years. Removing CO2 from the atmosphere results in cooling. Adding other limits to the long-term global goal, such as sea level rise or ocean acidification, only reinforces the basic finding emerging from the analysis of the temperature limit, namely that we need to take urgent and strong action to reduce GHG emissions. However, the limitations of working only with a temperature limit could be taken into account, for example, by aiming to limit global warming to below 2 °C.
Message 2
Imperatives of achieving the long-term global goal are explicitly articulated and at our disposal, and demonstrate the cumulative nature of the challenge and the need to act soon and decisively
Scenario analysis shows that limiting global warming to below 2 °C implies the following: a large reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions in the short to medium term, global carbon dioxide neutrality early in the second half of this century, and negative global greenhouse gas emissions towards the end of the twenty-first century. The longer we wait to bend the currently increasing curve of global emissions downward, the steeper we will have to bend it, even with negative emissions. Limiting global warming to below 2 °C necessitates a radical transition (deep decarbonization now and going forward), not merely a fine tuning of current trends.
Message 3
Assessing the adequacy of the long-term global goal implies risk assessments and value judgments not only at the global level, but also at the regional and local levels
The global climate determines regionally experienced risks. While global assessments of climate risks inform global policy choices and global risk management, they should be complemented by regional and local perspectives. A key element of these perspectives is the value judgment of when the scale (e.g. frequency and severity) of climate impacts results in a transition from ‘acceptable’ to ‘unacceptable’. This leads to a greater appreciation of the role played by all decision makers, including subnational authorities and cities.
Message 4
Climate change impacts are hitting home
Significant climate impacts are already occurring at the current level of global warming and additional magnitudes of warming will only increase the risk of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts. Therefore, the ‘guardrail’ concept, which implies a warming limit that guarantees full protection from dangerous anthropogenic interference, no longer works. This calls for a consideration of societally or otherwise acceptable risks of climate impacts.
Message 5
The 2 °C limit should be seen as a defence line
Limiting global warming to below 2 °C would significantly reduce the projected high and very high risks of climate impacts corresponding to 4 °C of warming, which is where we are headed under a ‘business as usual’ scenario. It would also allow a significantly greater potential for adaptation to reduce risks. However, many systems and people with limited adaptive capacity, notably the poor or otherwise disadvantaged, will still be at very high risk, and some risks, such as those from extreme weather events, will also remain high. Adaptation could reduce some risks (e.g. risks to food production could be reduced to ‘medium’) but the risks to crop yields and water availability are unevenly distributed. Moreover, the risks of global aggregated impacts and large-scale singular events will become moderate. The ‘guardrail’ concept, in which up to 2 °C of warming is considered safe, is inadequate and would therefore be better seen as an upper limit, a defence line that needs to be stringently defended, while less warming would be preferable.
Message 6
Limiting global warming to below 2 °C is still feasible and will bring about many co-benefits, but poses substantial technological, economic and institutional challenges
The costs are manageable, even without taking into account the co-benefits of mitigation, and various policy options could be deployed to manage the risks of the necessary mitigation action.
The feasibility of the long-term global goal could be assessed in an emerging, iterative, global risk management framework that has multiple feedbacks from different sources and takes into account planetary boundaries. To this end, periodic reviews would provide an opportunity to assess and reassess the overall progress towards reducing risks of climate impacts and progress of mitigation and adaptation action, thereby contributing to a science-based risk management of the pathways to a low-carbon and climate-resilient future.
Message 7
We know how to measure progress on mitigation but challenges still exist in measuring progress on adaptation
A generally accepted metric exists for aggregating and measuring overall progress on mitigation, but no single metric exists to quantify and aggregate the overall progress on adaptation. Similarly, a widely accepted metric to measure overall progress on reducing risks of climate impacts by adaptation would be required in the context of a global risk management framework.
Message 8
The world is not on track to achieve the long-term global goal, but successful mitigation policies are known and must be scaled up urgently
Greenhouse gas emission growth has accelerated, reaching a record high during the decade 2000–2010. The Cancun pledges are only consistent with the long-term global goal with pathways that require a much higher mitigation response later. Moreover, policies in place have had a limited impact on bending the emissions curve downward. However, successful mitigation policies have been identified and progress is being made on scaling them up, in particular in relation to putting a price on carbon and promoting otherwise low-carbon technologies, so that their share becomes dominant. We need benchmarks for sound climate policy in the light of national circumstances.
National information was not made available in a balanced manner for consideration by the structured expert dialogue, but such information could be considered in future reviews.
Message 9
We learned from various processes, in particular those under the Convention, about efforts to scale up provision of finance, technology and capacity-building for climate action
Many of the technologies required to achieve the long-term global goal are already available, but their deployment is not on track. Various barriers to their deployment and transfer have been identified. There is no widely accepted definition of climate finance, and uncertainties remain in the tracking of climate finance flows, in particular for adaptation finance and private finance, and to a lesser extent also for mitigation finance. Discussions are ongoing in various processes under the Convention regarding the resources required to address climate change under emission scenarios that limit the temperature increase to below 2 °C.
Institutions and processes launched under the Convention on technology and capacity-building have built a foundation for much greater effort, and progress has been achieved in the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund. The level of action now needs to be increased on all fronts.
Message 10
While science on the 1.5 °C warming limit is less robust, efforts should be made to push the defence line as low as possible
The science on the 1.5 °C warming limit is less robust than for the 2 °C warming limit or warming beyond this limit. Consequently, assessing the differences between the future impacts of climate risks for 1.5 °C and 2 °C of warming remains challenging. More scientific findings are likely to become available in the future, and considerations on strengthening the long-term global goal to 1.5 °C may therefore have to continue.
Nevertheless, limiting global warming to below 1.5 °C would come with several advantages in terms of coming closer to a safer ‘guardrail’. It would avoid or reduce risks, for example, to food production or unique and threatened systems such as coral reefs or many parts of the cryosphere, including the risk of sea level rise. On the other hand, this implies a more pronounced reliance on negative emissions with associated risks, including those from land-use change, as well as increases in mitigation costs in comparison with the 2 °C warming limit, and requires a larger temperature overshoot, which also carries certain risks.
However, while it is unclear whether the difference between 2 °C and 1.5 °C of warming is really only a matter of a gradual increase in risks or also includes some non-linear effects, as some evidence from the palaeo-record indicates,a Parties may wish to take a precautionary route by aiming for limiting global warming as far below 2 °C as possible, reaffirming the notion of a defence line or even a buffer zone keeping warming well below 2 °C.
Figure 1. The relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, cumulative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and changes in annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050.
Source: IPCC (2014)
Figure 2. Timings of global net-zero emissions for carbon dioxide (CO2; top row) and greenhouse gas (GHG; bottom row) in two different scenarios ("If we collectively act from 2020" vs "If we had begun the effort since 2010").
Source: UNEP (2014)
References:
IPCC. (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. [Full-text at http://j.mp/IPCC_AR5_Synthesis]
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), & Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). (2015). Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013–2015 review. Note by the co-facilitators of the structured expert dialogue. (FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1). Bonn, Germany: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). [Full-text at http://j.mp/SED_UNFCCC]
UNEP. (2014). The Emissions Gap Report 2014. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). [Full-text at http://j.mp/EGR2014]
van Renssen, S. (2015). Getting a fair deal. Nature Climate Change, 5(6), 513–514. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2661]
Tuesday, April 28, 2015
State of Non-Renewable Energy Resources at the Beginning of 2014
The latest global estimates of the reserves and resources of fossil and nuclear energy resources are published by the BGR (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe; Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources). So I updated my previous post.
You may find there are two tables below (Due to a technical reason, I couldn't separate them entirely). The first one is in exajoules, just as the source. The second is in million tonnes of oil equivalents. At the beginning of 2014, the world had approximately 73 years' supply of non-renewable energy resources that could be economically exploited with contemporary technologies.
(According to the BGR's glossaries,
Reserves = Proven volumes of energy commodities economically exploitable at today’s prices and using today’s technology (Initial reserves: cumulative production plus remaining reserves);
Resources = Proven amounts of energy resources which cannot currently be exploited for technical and/or economic reasons, as well as unproven but geologically possible energy resources which may be exploitable in future. For coal this term is used for all in-place resources.)
Reference:
BGR. (2014). Energy Study 2014: Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources. Hannover, Germany: Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources). [Full-text at http://j.mp/FF_RR_2015]
You may find there are two tables below (Due to a technical reason, I couldn't separate them entirely). The first one is in exajoules, just as the source. The second is in million tonnes of oil equivalents. At the beginning of 2014, the world had approximately 73 years' supply of non-renewable energy resources that could be economically exploited with contemporary technologies.
(According to the BGR's glossaries,
Reserves = Proven volumes of energy commodities economically exploitable at today’s prices and using today’s technology (Initial reserves: cumulative production plus remaining reserves);
Resources = Proven amounts of energy resources which cannot currently be exploited for technical and/or economic reasons, as well as unproven but geologically possible energy resources which may be exploitable in future. For coal this term is used for all in-place resources.)
| State of Non-Renewable Energy Resources, at the End of 2013 | |||||||||
| Unit: | EJ (= 1018 joules) | ||||||||
| Crude oil | Natural gas | Coal | Nuclear energy | Total | |||||
| conventional | non- conventional | conventional [1] | non- conventional [2] | hard coal | lignite | uranium | thorium | ||
| Reserves |
9,137
|
7,526
|
20,378
|
606
| 37,646 | ||||
| 7,126 | 2,011 | 7,318 | 208 | 17,148 | 3,230 | 606 | – | ||
| Resources |
13,959
|
24,257
|
489,766
|
9,859
| 537,840 | ||||
| 6,745 | 7,214 | 12,099 | 12,158 | 438,034 [3] | 51,732 | 6,681 | 3,178 [4] | ||
| Production in 2013 |
175.6
|
130.0
|
179.0
|
29.8
| 514.5 | ||||
| 168.7 | 10.3 | 29.8 | |||||||
| Consumption in 2013 |
176.7
|
130.5
|
178.4
|
32.5
| 518.1 | ||||
| 168.4 | 10.0 | 32.5 | |||||||
| Reserves-to-production ratio (years) |
52
|
58
|
114
|
20
| 73 | ||||
| 102 | 314 | 20 | |||||||
| [1] including tight gas [2] without natural gas in gas hydrates and aquifer gas (7,904 EJ) [3] including hard coal in the Antarctic (3,825 EJ) [4] including thorium without country allocation (62 EJ) | |||||||||
| State of Non-Renewable Energy Resources, at the End of 2013 | |||||||||
| Unit: | million toe | ||||||||
| Crude oil | Natural gas | Coal | Nuclear energy | Total | |||||
| conventional | non- conventional | conventional | non- conventional | hard coal | lignite | uranium | thorium | ||
| Reserves |
218,233
|
179,755
|
486,720
|
14,474
| 899,159 | ||||
| 170,202 | 48,032 | 174,787 | 4,968 | 409,573 | 77,147 | 14,474 | – | ||
| Resources |
333,405
|
579,368
|
11,697,860
|
235,478
| 12,846,088 | ||||
| 161,102 | 172,303 | 288,980 | 290,389 | 10,462,262 | 1,235,598 | 159,573 | 75,905 | ||
| Production in 2013 |
4,194
|
3,105
|
4,275
|
712
| 12,289 | ||||
| 4,029 | 246 | 712 | |||||||
| Consumption in 2013 |
4,220
|
3,117
|
4,261
|
776
| 12,375 | ||||
| 4,022 | 239 | 776 | |||||||
| Reserves-to-production ratio (years) |
52
|
58
|
114
|
20
| 73 | ||||
| 102 | 314 | 20 | |||||||
| Conversion factor: | |||||||||
| 1 EJ = 23,884,589.66275 toe | |||||||||
Reference:
BGR. (2014). Energy Study 2014: Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources. Hannover, Germany: Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources). [Full-text at http://j.mp/FF_RR_2015]
Monday, March 16, 2015
An Indirect Look at Radioactive Material Leaks from Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant
It's been four years since Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant was ravaged by a tsunami that was triggered by a historic earthquake in March 2011. Radioactive materials leaked from the accident are forecasted to raise the radiation levels in coastal waters of North America as high as 3–5 becquerels per cubic meter (Bq/m3) during 2015-2016 (Smith et al., 2014). The same study is expecting the seawater radiation levels will drop to normal levels (1 Bq/m3) in 2021. Then can we expect that there will be no more leaking of radioactive materials from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant?
The following figure visually summarizes the levels of radioactive cesium in seawater, sediment, and fish tissue that had been sampled at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant port from the pre-accident period to three years after the accident.
Firstly, before the accident, seawater radiation levels resulting from radioactive cesium were lower than 0.01 becquerel per liter (Bq/liter). In 2014, the activity concentrations of 134,137Cs were still around 10 Bq/liter, more than 1,000 times the pre-accident radiation levels.
Secondly, fishes caught before the 2011 accident showed radioactive cesium concentrations of lower than 0.1 becquerel per kilogram (Bq/kg). Even three years after the accident, the fish tissue radioactivity levels were recorded between 10 to 100,000 Bq/kg.
Thirdly, radioactive cesium activity concentrations in sediment didn't drop significantly at least until 2014, compared to the post-accident 2011 levels, either. Only highest activity concentrations seem to have declined.
All in all, leaking of radioactive materials from Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant is not being controlled yet, apparently. I expect more thorough monitoring data will come out soon. Until then, let us not be so decisive about the effects of the tragic accident, whether being optimistic or pessimistic.
Figure. 134,137Cs activity concentrations in seawater, sediment, and muscle tissue samples from four species, of similar trophic levels (TLs), from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant port. Lines represent means of data over 60-day intervals.
Source: Johansen, et al., 2015
References:
Johansen, M. P., et al. (2015). Radiological Dose Rates to Marine Fish from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: The First Three Years Across the North Pacific. Environmental Science & Technology, 49, 1277–1285. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/es505064d]
Smith, J. N., et al. (2015). Arrival of the Fukushima radioactivity plume in North American continental waters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(5), 1310–1315. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1412814112]
The following figure visually summarizes the levels of radioactive cesium in seawater, sediment, and fish tissue that had been sampled at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant port from the pre-accident period to three years after the accident.
Firstly, before the accident, seawater radiation levels resulting from radioactive cesium were lower than 0.01 becquerel per liter (Bq/liter). In 2014, the activity concentrations of 134,137Cs were still around 10 Bq/liter, more than 1,000 times the pre-accident radiation levels.
Secondly, fishes caught before the 2011 accident showed radioactive cesium concentrations of lower than 0.1 becquerel per kilogram (Bq/kg). Even three years after the accident, the fish tissue radioactivity levels were recorded between 10 to 100,000 Bq/kg.
Thirdly, radioactive cesium activity concentrations in sediment didn't drop significantly at least until 2014, compared to the post-accident 2011 levels, either. Only highest activity concentrations seem to have declined.
All in all, leaking of radioactive materials from Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant is not being controlled yet, apparently. I expect more thorough monitoring data will come out soon. Until then, let us not be so decisive about the effects of the tragic accident, whether being optimistic or pessimistic.
Figure. 134,137Cs activity concentrations in seawater, sediment, and muscle tissue samples from four species, of similar trophic levels (TLs), from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant port. Lines represent means of data over 60-day intervals.
Source: Johansen, et al., 2015
References:
Johansen, M. P., et al. (2015). Radiological Dose Rates to Marine Fish from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident: The First Three Years Across the North Pacific. Environmental Science & Technology, 49, 1277–1285. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/es505064d]
Smith, J. N., et al. (2015). Arrival of the Fukushima radioactivity plume in North American continental waters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 112(5), 1310–1315. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1412814112]
Tuesday, February 24, 2015
Particle (PM2.5) Pollution by Country in 2005 and 2010
Outdoor air pollution is becoming a serious health threat in East Asia. A former Beijing TV reporter's presentation about Chin'a heavy PM2.5 pollution (https://youtu.be/T6X2uwlQGQM) is said to generate a national sensation. To cite a serious study, a 10 µg/m3 rise in ambient PM2.5 concentration increases the relative risks of developing two types of lung cancer: adenocarcinoma by 40% and squamous cell carcinoma by 11% (Hamra et al., 2014). In addition, a recent study (Rohde & Muller, 2015) even estimated that about 17% of total annual deaths in China is due to premature deaths caused by people's chronic exposure to high PM2.5 concentrations.
So I looked at pollution data provided by the World Bank. Although just two years' data cannot show any meaningful direction for further explanation, the global particle pollution seems getting worse. The global mean annual exposure increased from 29.9 µg/m3 in 2005 to 31.3 µg/m3 in 2010. Pollution from industrial and transport sectors might be the main cause.
However, there is one important condition that we can easily overlook. Although countries with vast area of deserts recorded higher pollution levels, the effects of natural dust and sea salt should be removed to better assess the health impacts of PM2.5. So, after the final PM2.5 concentration map from SEDAC below (Figure 1), I am introducing additional images (Figure 2) from a recent study (van Donkelaar et al., 2015) that used the same satellite observation data.
Table. PM2.5 Pollution (mean annual exposure)
Unit: µg/m3
Source: World Bank. (2015). World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: The World Bank. [Data at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators]
Figure 1. Global Annual Average PM2.5 Grids (2001–2010).
Source: SEDAC, 2013
Figure 2. Comparison of PM2.5 concentration with and without natural dust and sea salt (2001–2010).
Source: van Donkelaar et al., 2015
References:
Hamra, G. B., et al. (2014). Outdoor Particulate Matter Exposure and Lung Cancer: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Environmental Health Perspectives, 122(9), 906–911. DOI: 10.1289/ehp/1408092. [Full-text at http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/12987239/4154221.pdf]
Rohde, R. A., & Muller, R. A. (2015). Air Pollution in China: Mapping of Concentrations and Sources. PLoS ONE, 10(8), e0135749. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0135749]
Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). (2013). Global Annual Average PM2.5 Grids from MODIS and MISR Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD), v1 (2001 – 2010). [Map image at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/sdei-global-annual-avg-pm2-5-2001-2010]
van Donkelaar, A., Martin, R. V., Brauer, M., & Boys, B. L. (2015). Use of Satellite Observations for Long-Term Exposure Assessment of Global Concentrations of Fine Particulate Matter. Environmental Health Perspectives, 123(2), 135–143. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1408646]
So I looked at pollution data provided by the World Bank. Although just two years' data cannot show any meaningful direction for further explanation, the global particle pollution seems getting worse. The global mean annual exposure increased from 29.9 µg/m3 in 2005 to 31.3 µg/m3 in 2010. Pollution from industrial and transport sectors might be the main cause.
However, there is one important condition that we can easily overlook. Although countries with vast area of deserts recorded higher pollution levels, the effects of natural dust and sea salt should be removed to better assess the health impacts of PM2.5. So, after the final PM2.5 concentration map from SEDAC below (Figure 1), I am introducing additional images (Figure 2) from a recent study (van Donkelaar et al., 2015) that used the same satellite observation data.
Table. PM2.5 Pollution (mean annual exposure)
Unit: µg/m3
| Country | 2005 | 2010 |
| United Arab Emirates | 65.68166 | 79.51939 |
| China | 63.99531 | 72.56515 |
| Qatar | 59.87048 | 69.02888 |
| Mauritania | 69.93466 | 65.18214 |
| Saudi Arabia | 62.20242 | 61.68340 |
| Kuwait | 49.41866 | 50.39333 |
| Bahrain | 48.01391 | 49.33072 |
| Turkmenistan | 48.76600 | 48.28830 |
| Cabo Verde | 43.36331 | 42.86366 |
| Senegal | 41.36001 | 41.19929 |
| Pakistan | 37.28355 | 38.10374 |
| Korea, South | 40.09238 | 37.52048 |
| Libya | 36.42195 | 37.18039 |
| Niger | 37.36272 | 36.82437 |
| Gambia, The | 35.93841 | 35.75570 |
| Oman | 34.12933 | 35.29841 |
| Mali | 34.62133 | 34.11404 |
| Chad | 34.03407 | 33.35825 |
| Nepal | 30.66388 | 32.66240 |
| Egypt, Arab Rep. | 33.59428 | 32.58492 |
| India | 31.46866 | 32.02058 |
| Korea, North | 30.72270 | 31.51703 |
| World | 29.86480 | 31.25349 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 31.11515 | 31.21841 |
| Bangladesh | 29.84423 | 31.13156 |
| Iraq | 30.63495 | 30.39379 |
| Yemen, Rep. | 30.81548 | 30.16242 |
| Vietnam | 28.87354 | 29.80268 |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. | 30.02963 | 29.69507 |
| Jordan | 29.53331 | 28.77559 |
| Burkina Faso | 27.48525 | 27.35054 |
| Nigeria | 26.93633 | 27.07458 |
| Djibouti | 26.51410 | 26.83520 |
| Israel | 26.88058 | 26.18212 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 26.77977 | 25.99799 |
| Sudan | 26.07869 | 25.86403 |
| West Bank and Gaza | 26.06656 | 25.37601 |
| Eritrea | 24.44714 | 24.53869 |
| Afghanistan | 24.32812 | 23.89933 |
| Lebanon | 24.58599 | 23.79930 |
| Lao PDR | 21.19542 | 22.45218 |
| Guinea | 22.65570 | 22.28595 |
| Cameroon | 22.08601 | 22.17291 |
| Uzbekistan | 23.72026 | 22.10496 |
| Algeria | 22.43683 | 22.04645 |
| Benin | 22.20245 | 21.92649 |
| Japan | 22.79315 | 21.81006 |
| Myanmar | 21.72509 | 21.77255 |
| Bhutan | 20.19818 | 21.72453 |
| Malta | 22.76602 | 21.30753 |
| Thailand | 20.87660 | 21.07797 |
| Togo | 21.33735 | 20.98064 |
| Morocco | 20.13554 | 19.97916 |
| Singapore | 20.85270 | 19.82913 |
| Barbados | 19.47597 | 19.41978 |
| Central African Republic | 19.76822 | 19.21593 |
| Italy | 21.74040 | 19.04609 |
| Tunisia | 19.76945 | 19.04604 |
| Cyprus | 19.76426 | 18.96764 |
| Belgium | 22.08128 | 18.80821 |
| Armenia | 19.92665 | 18.73134 |
| Netherlands | 21.72581 | 18.54935 |
| Ghana | 18.37616 | 18.01068 |
| Dominica | 17.78881 | 17.98825 |
| St. Lucia | 18.18060 | 17.96446 |
| Sierra Leone | 17.85903 | 17.63314 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 17.41343 | 17.45214 |
| Turkey | 18.49803 | 17.44953 |
| Cambodia | 17.54926 | 17.43361 |
| Azerbaijan | 18.74119 | 17.28889 |
| Romania | 20.75279 | 17.25078 |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 17.39695 | 17.09740 |
| Greece | 18.90921 | 16.89706 |
| Macedonia, FYR | 19.14504 | 16.85793 |
| Bulgaria | 19.53040 | 16.81881 |
| Tajikistan | 18.57619 | 16.68379 |
| Mexico | 16.83631 | 16.64726 |
| Hungary | 19.84951 | 16.24823 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 18.22999 | 15.98221 |
| Montenegro | 18.57360 | 15.89186 |
| Serbia | 18.57360 | 15.89186 |
| Germany | 19.04302 | 15.85773 |
| Poland | 18.98603 | 15.78261 |
| Maldives | 15.19199 | 15.75179 |
| Czech Republic | 19.45999 | 15.66124 |
| Ethiopia | 15.39432 | 15.41976 |
| Grenada | 16.07247 | 15.27145 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 15.46996 | 15.24135 |
| Slovenia | 17.64982 | 15.23634 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 15.12717 | 15.13202 |
| Slovak Republic | 18.22347 | 15.00319 |
| Croatia | 16.92603 | 14.36613 |
| France | 15.61563 | 14.33079 |
| Albania | 16.41100 | 14.29622 |
| Rwanda | 14.13845 | 14.16464 |
| Congo, Rep. | 14.78158 | 14.02519 |
| Spain | 14.81681 | 13.98518 |
| Switzerland | 15.91973 | 13.86089 |
| Indonesia | 13.93691 | 13.80772 |
| Moldova | 16.84122 | 13.79449 |
| United Kingdom | 14.91859 | 13.70214 |
| Kazakhstan | 13.17328 | 13.39266 |
| United States | 13.73764 | 13.38303 |
| Luxembourg | 15.67862 | 13.29090 |
| Austria | 15.01844 | 13.22534 |
| Bahamas, The | 13.24748 | 13.02847 |
| Andorra | 13.67137 | 12.99452 |
| Malaysia | 13.08630 | 12.94251 |
| Ukraine | 15.49109 | 12.69998 |
| Portugal | 11.77354 | 12.53817 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 13.42289 | 12.41069 |
| Georgia | 11.77928 | 12.00855 |
| Jamaica | 10.17643 | 11.96345 |
| Guatemala | 10.63070 | 11.85139 |
| Denmark | 11.53602 | 11.70216 |
| Haiti | 12.10771 | 11.42943 |
| Burundi | 11.49712 | 11.23896 |
| Angola | 10.35762 | 11.23079 |
| Belarus | 10.29214 | 10.64201 |
| Lithuania | 7.88313 | 10.15811 |
| Canada | 10.28616 | 10.14480 |
| Uganda | 10.87613 | 10.03688 |
| Peru | 10.16026 | 9.80432 |
| Russian Federation | 8.75458 | 9.59945 |
| Mongolia | 9.32179 | 9.20861 |
| Latvia | 5.01399 | 9.14117 |
| Dominican Republic | 9.56640 | 8.90070 |
| Liberia | 8.21280 | 8.78300 |
| Ireland | 7.04813 | 8.67139 |
| Sri Lanka | 10.24467 | 8.61689 |
| Somalia | 8.13699 | 8.21147 |
| Costa Rica | 5.02749 | 8.19678 |
| Chile | 8.12389 | 8.13966 |
| Venezuela, RB | 6.27769 | 8.09122 |
| Marshall Islands | 5.08027 | 7.85952 |
| South Africa | 7.20781 | 7.80041 |
| Estonia | 5.00164 | 7.24874 |
| Philippines | 6.96318 | 7.06607 |
| Cuba | 6.85605 | 6.94057 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 7.34036 | 6.85246 |
| Honduras | 6.70937 | 6.72552 |
| Kiribati | 6.34917 | 6.42433 |
| Guyana | 6.36976 | 6.26987 |
| Gabon | 6.36254 | 6.09124 |
| Bolivia | 5.85383 | 6.04628 |
| Sweden | 5.85217 | 5.99107 |
| Lesotho | 5.00127 | 5.93226 |
| Kenya | 5.08719 | 5.84695 |
| Iceland | 5.68715 | 5.83887 |
| Solomon Islands | 5.02314 | 5.81406 |
| Uruguay | 5.00428 | 5.80678 |
| Australia | 5.01004 | 5.68590 |
| Zambia | 5.08932 | 5.63978 |
| Ecuador | 5.83868 | 5.61844 |
| New Zealand | 5.13576 | 5.58406 |
| Belize | 5.45297 | 5.54806 |
| Timor-Leste | 5.00523 | 5.44113 |
| Tanzania | 5.29027 | 5.42503 |
| Colombia | 5.26264 | 5.40619 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 5.01483 | 5.40484 |
| Papua New Guinea | 5.00340 | 5.37060 |
| Fiji | 5.02250 | 5.35870 |
| Nicaragua | 5.09545 | 5.34375 |
| Panama | 5.00599 | 5.30016 |
| El Salvador | 5.05292 | 5.24743 |
| Seychelles | 4.92666 | 5.24212 |
| Finland | 4.99448 | 5.22406 |
| Madagascar | 5.00159 | 5.21810 |
| Vanuatu | 5.00859 | 5.21081 |
| Botswana | 5.00322 | 5.16612 |
| Tonga | 5.08818 | 5.14790 |
| Mozambique | 4.99959 | 5.11382 |
| Mauritius | 5.09764 | 5.07905 |
| Brazil | 5.25013 | 5.07802 |
| Suriname | 5.29545 | 5.05235 |
| Argentina | 5.21216 | 4.98674 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 4.95706 | 4.97077 |
| Samoa | 4.99461 | 4.92124 |
| Swaziland | 5.00995 | 4.91671 |
| Malawi | 5.00105 | 4.87758 |
| Zimbabwe | 5.00225 | 4.77891 |
| Comoros | 4.95402 | 4.72747 |
| Micronesia, Fed. Sts. | 4.99973 | 4.69715 |
| Paraguay | 5.00445 | 4.47555 |
| Namibia | 5.25051 | 4.44832 |
| Norway | 5.56339 | 4.40615 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 5.26734 | 4.39580 |
Figure 1. Global Annual Average PM2.5 Grids (2001–2010).
Source: SEDAC, 2013
Figure 2. Comparison of PM2.5 concentration with and without natural dust and sea salt (2001–2010).
Source: van Donkelaar et al., 2015
References:
Hamra, G. B., et al. (2014). Outdoor Particulate Matter Exposure and Lung Cancer: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Environmental Health Perspectives, 122(9), 906–911. DOI: 10.1289/ehp/1408092. [Full-text at http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/12987239/4154221.pdf]
Rohde, R. A., & Muller, R. A. (2015). Air Pollution in China: Mapping of Concentrations and Sources. PLoS ONE, 10(8), e0135749. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0135749]
Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). (2013). Global Annual Average PM2.5 Grids from MODIS and MISR Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD), v1 (2001 – 2010). [Map image at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/sdei-global-annual-avg-pm2-5-2001-2010]
van Donkelaar, A., Martin, R. V., Brauer, M., & Boys, B. L. (2015). Use of Satellite Observations for Long-Term Exposure Assessment of Global Concentrations of Fine Particulate Matter. Environmental Health Perspectives, 123(2), 135–143. [Full-text at http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1408646]
Thursday, February 5, 2015
Efficiency of Energy Conversion and Delivery in G20 Countries, 2000-2012
How do we measure the efficiency of energy conversion and delivery at a country level? I am here using the 'final to primary energy ratios,' which is coined by the UN's Sustainable Energy for All initiative. As the name implies, it is simply calculated by dividing a country's 'total primary energy supply' (TPES) by her 'total final energy consumption' (TFEC or TFC).
I compared the ratios between G20 countries (except the European Union). The following figure shows a gradual decline of the energy conversion and delivery efficiency. The latest IEA/World Bank report for the Sustainable Energy for All initiative ("Global Tracking Framework Report")) explains that main causes would be "the growth in coal use for electricity generation, and coal, oil, and gas consumption for heat provision relative to other primary resources" (p. 123). In my opinion, electric heating (instead of heating by direct combustion of gas/coal/oil/biomass) is another cause of the declining shares of final energy consumption in primary energy supply due to increased number of energy conversion stages.
As for coal power's effects on lowering energy conversion efficiency, the reason is clear. Recently, a dutch energy consultancy Ecofys reviewed the performance of fossil power plants in Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway aggregated), South Korea, United Kingdom and Ireland (aggregated), and the United States. The study (2014) finds, in 2011, the weighted average energy efficiency of coal-fired power plants was 35%, that of gas-fired power plants was 48%, and that of oil power plants was nearly 40%.
Increasing consumption of the low-efficiency coal power explains why China's efficiency is getting worse every year. According to the World Bank's database for the Sustainable Energy for All initiative, China's coal power production grew at an annual growth rate of 11.8% from 2000–2010, whereas the country's primary energy supply rose by 8% annually during the same period.
South Africa's heavy dependence on coal power (94% of electricity production in 2010) might be keeping the country at a remote bottom among G20 countries in terms of energy transformation efficiency.
I cannot explain Saudi Arabia's sudden efficiency improvement in 2011 and 2012. Because Canada's efficiency has also improved recently, I suspect management strategies of the surplus crude oil by the two oil exporting countries have any effect on the final to primary energy ratios.
However, there's a problem in this accounting method of aggregating different energy resources. Because the overarching unit of the IEA's energy balance, tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE), cannot appropriately deal with renewable and nuclear energy sources. While fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) can relatively easily compared among each other by their thermal energy content, it is very difficult to compare renewable and nuclear energy sources. Therefore, most renewable energy sources and the energy in nuclear fuel rods (mostly, processed uranium) are measured by the amount of electricity generated by each source.
The prime example is Brazil. Because the country's electricity mostly comes from hydro power (87% of electricity production in 2000; 78% in 2010), the final to primary energy ratio has been number one until outranked by Canada, another heavyweight producer of hydro power (59% of electricity production in 2012).
I think this mixed dealing with fuel and non-fossil energy sources are distorting the overall energy transformation efficiency statistics. Or am I unaware of a simple solution of my frustration over this problem?
References:
Hussy, C. Klaassen, E., Koornneef, J., & Wigand, F. (2014). International Comparison of Fossil Power Efficiency and CO2 Intensity - Update 2014. Utrecht, The Netherlands: Ecofys. [Full-text at http://j.mp/Powerplants_EE]
International Energy Agency. (2003–2014). Energy Balances of OECD Countries. Paris, France: IEA Publications.
International Energy Agency. (2003–2014). Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries. Paris, France: IEA Publications.
International Energy Agency, & World Bank. (2014). Sustainable Energy for All 2013-2014: Global Tracking Framework Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. [Full-text at http://j.mp/SE4All_13-14]
World Bank. (2014). Sustainable Energy for All. Washington, DC: The World Bank. [Data at http://j.mp/SE4ALL]
I compared the ratios between G20 countries (except the European Union). The following figure shows a gradual decline of the energy conversion and delivery efficiency. The latest IEA/World Bank report for the Sustainable Energy for All initiative ("Global Tracking Framework Report")) explains that main causes would be "the growth in coal use for electricity generation, and coal, oil, and gas consumption for heat provision relative to other primary resources" (p. 123). In my opinion, electric heating (instead of heating by direct combustion of gas/coal/oil/biomass) is another cause of the declining shares of final energy consumption in primary energy supply due to increased number of energy conversion stages.
As for coal power's effects on lowering energy conversion efficiency, the reason is clear. Recently, a dutch energy consultancy Ecofys reviewed the performance of fossil power plants in Australia, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway aggregated), South Korea, United Kingdom and Ireland (aggregated), and the United States. The study (2014) finds, in 2011, the weighted average energy efficiency of coal-fired power plants was 35%, that of gas-fired power plants was 48%, and that of oil power plants was nearly 40%.
Increasing consumption of the low-efficiency coal power explains why China's efficiency is getting worse every year. According to the World Bank's database for the Sustainable Energy for All initiative, China's coal power production grew at an annual growth rate of 11.8% from 2000–2010, whereas the country's primary energy supply rose by 8% annually during the same period.
South Africa's heavy dependence on coal power (94% of electricity production in 2010) might be keeping the country at a remote bottom among G20 countries in terms of energy transformation efficiency.
I cannot explain Saudi Arabia's sudden efficiency improvement in 2011 and 2012. Because Canada's efficiency has also improved recently, I suspect management strategies of the surplus crude oil by the two oil exporting countries have any effect on the final to primary energy ratios.
However, there's a problem in this accounting method of aggregating different energy resources. Because the overarching unit of the IEA's energy balance, tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE), cannot appropriately deal with renewable and nuclear energy sources. While fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) can relatively easily compared among each other by their thermal energy content, it is very difficult to compare renewable and nuclear energy sources. Therefore, most renewable energy sources and the energy in nuclear fuel rods (mostly, processed uranium) are measured by the amount of electricity generated by each source.
The prime example is Brazil. Because the country's electricity mostly comes from hydro power (87% of electricity production in 2000; 78% in 2010), the final to primary energy ratio has been number one until outranked by Canada, another heavyweight producer of hydro power (59% of electricity production in 2012).
I think this mixed dealing with fuel and non-fossil energy sources are distorting the overall energy transformation efficiency statistics. Or am I unaware of a simple solution of my frustration over this problem?
References:
Hussy, C. Klaassen, E., Koornneef, J., & Wigand, F. (2014). International Comparison of Fossil Power Efficiency and CO2 Intensity - Update 2014. Utrecht, The Netherlands: Ecofys. [Full-text at http://j.mp/Powerplants_EE]
International Energy Agency. (2003–2014). Energy Balances of OECD Countries. Paris, France: IEA Publications.
International Energy Agency. (2003–2014). Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries. Paris, France: IEA Publications.
International Energy Agency, & World Bank. (2014). Sustainable Energy for All 2013-2014: Global Tracking Framework Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. [Full-text at http://j.mp/SE4All_13-14]
World Bank. (2014). Sustainable Energy for All. Washington, DC: The World Bank. [Data at http://j.mp/SE4ALL]
Monday, January 19, 2015
Cost of Energy Comparison, Including Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) - 2015 Update
I updated the list in a new post for the year of 2016. Please move to the post cited below.
Park, H. (2016). Cost of Energy Comparison, Including Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) - 2016 Update [Blog post]. Retrieved from http://j.mp/LCOE_2016
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